Adaptive clustering with feature ranking for DDoS attacks detection by Zi, Lifang et al.
Adaptive Clustering with Feature Ranking for
DDoS Attacks Detection
Lifang Zi, John Yearwoody, Xin-Wen Wuz
yGraduate School of Information Technology and Mathematical Sciences
University of Ballarat, PO Box 663, Ballarat, Victoria, 3353, Australia
zSchool of Information and Communication Technology
Griffith University, Gold Coast, Queensland, 4222, Australia
Email: l.zi@ballarat.edu.au, yj.yearwood@ballarat.edu.au, zx.wu@griffith.edu.au
Abstract—Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks pose
an increasing threat to the current internet. The detection
of such attacks plays an important role in maintaining the
security of networks. In this paper, we propose a novel adaptive
clustering method combined with feature ranking for DDoS
attacks detection. First, based on the analysis of network traffic,
preliminary variables are selected. Second, the Modified Global
K-means algorithm (MGKM) is used as the basic incremental
clustering algorithm to identify the cluster structure of the target
data. Third, the linear correlation coefficient is used for feature
ranking. Lastly, the feature ranking result is used to inform
and recalculate the clusters. This adaptive process can make
worthwhile adjustments to the working feature vector according
to different patterns of DDoS attacks, and can improve the quality
of the clusters and the effectiveness of the clustering algorithm.
The experimental results demonstrate that our method is effective
and adaptive in detecting the separate phases of DDoS attacks.
Index Terms—Adaptive clustering; Feature ranking; DDoS
detection;
I. INTRODUCTION
DDoS attacks are one of the major threats to internet secu-
rity. A DDoS attack is a coordinated attack on the availability
of services of a given target system or network that is launched
indirectly through many compromised computing systems [1].
According to [2], the DDoS attacks usually have two phases
and involve three classes. In the first phase of an DDoS attack,
the attacker infiltrates multiple computer systems and installs
the DDoS tools which are scripts capable of generating large
volume of traffic under command from the attacker. This phase
is called pre-attack. The second phase is the actual DDoS
attack. Under command from the attacker, the slaves which
are the hosts compromised by the attacker in the first phase
generate attack traffic to bring down the target system [1]. The
target is called the victim as well. Therefore, three classes are
the attacker, the slaves, and the victim respectively.
Some countermeasures have been proposed for preventing
DDoS attacks. There mainly are two streams of DDoS coun-
termeasures. One is to detect or prevent a potential DDoS
attack. The other one is about post-attack forensics. Statistical
methods [3], [4], [5] which usually analyze some parameters of
the network traffic in order to identify statistical patterns of the
traffic are effective for DDoS detection. Filtering methods [6],
[7] aim at DDoS detection and anomaly traffic defence. These
methods often refer to the scanning of IP packet headers and
checking to see if they meet certain criteria [1]. If the packets
do not pass the criteria, they will not be sent. Considering post-
attack forensics, the stored traffic data can be analyzed after
attack to help identify the attackers. This technique is called
traceback. Many traceback schemes have been proposed, such
as link testing [8], logging [9], and packet marking [10], [11].
It is essential to detect DDoS attacks fast and accurately,
because there is little time to detect and confirm an ongoing
DDoS attack on-line [4]. DDoS traffic generated by today’s
tools often has packet crafting characteristics that make it
possible to distinguish from normal traffic [12]. Changes in
traffic should exist from the preparation of a DDoS attack
to the real attack happening. Therefore, it is possible to
identifying some clues to detect an attack. Furthermore, if
such attacks can be recognized proactively, it is more likely
to prevent these attacks before they cause big trouble.
In this paper, we present a novel adaptive clustering method
combined with feature ranking for DDoS attacks detection.
In our scheme, an adaptive process is applied to figure out
the most sensitive features for the clustering algorithm. The
objective of our research is to identify the different phases
of DDoS attacks accurately and efficiently. Compared with
other statistical approaches for DDoS detection, our method
has two obvious advantages: first, there is no need to know the
data distribution in advance since we use clustering method.
Second, it can adaptively select the working feature vector
according to different patterns of DDoS attacks, and achieve
sound clustering result. Our method can be applied in the real
network for intrusion detection because of the low complexity.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II introduces the previous research work relevant to statistical
methods used in DDoS detection. Section III describes our
proposed method in detail. Section IV presents the experi-
mental results and analysis. Section V is the discussion part.
Section VI gives out the conclusion of this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Statistical method is a straight forward method to detect
anomalies. Some statistical approaches have been proposed
for DDoS attacks defense.
Cabrera et al. [3] introduced a methodology for automat-
ically extracting probable precursors of DDoS attacks using
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MIB (Management Information Base) Traffic Variables. This
method is unable to solve the problem when the victim and
attacker are on different network.
Liao and Vemuri [13] proposed a algorithm based on the
k-Nearest Neighbor classifier method for modeling program
behavior in intrusion detection. This method is effective.
However, The limitation of this method is that it relies on the
prior known data distribution in order to set up corresponding
training set. In terms of this, such method may not be
applicable for real-time detection.
Streilein et al. [14] used multiple neural network classifiers
to detect several classes of attacks. However, using multilayer
perception requires relatively more precessing time for DDoS
detection.
Gavrilis and Dermatas [15] presented a Radial-basis-
function neural network detector for DDoS attacks based
on statistical features estimated in short-time window anal-
ysis of the incoming data packets. This method requires
communication among three agents. Exchanging information
has vulnerabilities with respect to security. Besides, applying
occurrence probabilities of attack events can lead to biased
results in attack detection.
Most of the previous research work make use of the attack
traffic generated by the agents for DDoS attacks detection.
However, it deserves to analyze the traffic generated during
the preparation phases of a DDoS attack as well for proactive
attack detection, since the earlier a DDoS attack is detected,
the more time there is for preparing defense schemes [5].
Considering this, Lee et al. [5] proposed using a hierarchical
clustering method for proactive DDoS detection. The clus-
tering result of this method relies on the original working
feature vector which can not be adjusted during the clustering
process once they are determined. Actually, the contribution of
each feature to the clustering result may be different and the
mutual influence among the features may exist. Corresponding
to a specific DDoS attack, if the working feature vector
can be optimized by removing the redundant features, the
potential disturbance among features can be mitigated and the
effectiveness of the clustering algorithm can be improved by
reducing dimensionality and removing irrelevant data.
In this paper, we propose an adaptive clustering method for
DDoS attacks detection. Compared with the scheme in [5],
our approach use an partitioning clustering algorithm and has
a self-adaptive ability which enables the detection scheme to
make proper adjustment to the working feature vector when
processing the traffic data of different DDoS attacks.
III. ADAPTIVE CLUSTERING APPROACH FOR DDOS
ATTACKS DETECTION
In this paper, we use an adaptive clustering approach to
determine cluster structure of DDoS attacks. As Figure 1
shows, first, we choose several variables by analyzing the
characteristics of DDoS traffic. Second, we use the Modified
Global K-means algorithm (MGKM) as the basic clustering
algorithm to detect the cluster structure of the target data.
Thrid, on the basis of the clustering solution with preliminary
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MGKM
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process
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Fig. 1. Adaptive clustering with feature ranking
variables, we make a feature ranking using the linear cor-
relation coefficients. Lastly, according to the feature ranking
result, several top ranked features as the new working feature
vector are chosen manually. Our clustering method for DDoS
attacks detection is adaptive as external feedbacks are given
to improve the clustering result.
A. Preliminary variable selection
Lee et al. [5] presented nine features based on the analysis
of network traffic. A DDoS attack usually has three steps, first,
selection of slaves; second, communication and compromise;
lastly, attack. We can observe the procedure of a DDoS attack
to find out traffic parameters which change abnormally in each
step.
In the first step, attackers send ICMP Echo Request to find
slaves, which is called IPsweep [3]. In this procedure, many
ICMP packets are generated. Therefore, the occurrence rate
of ICMP packets may be abnormally high. For the commu-
nication and compromise between different slaves, increased
volume of a specific traffic type such as UDP, TCP SYN and
ICMP packets can be used for message exchange. Therefore,
the occurrence rates of these types of packets can indicate the
preparation for launching a DDoS attack.
The distribution of source IP address, destination IP address,
source port and destination port can also provide worthwhile
information. In order to measure the degree of divergence, Lee
et al. [5] suggest to use the theory of information entropy [12].
The entropy value gives a description about the corresponding
random distribution of a variable. The bigger the entropy, the
more dispersive the variable is. Entropy can be computed on
a sample of consecutive packets. Let an information source
has n independent symbols each with probability of choice
Pi. Then, the entropy H is defined as follows [16]:
H =  
nX
i=1
pi log2 pi
In the IPsweep phase, an attacker spreads packets to find
slaves. The entropy value of source IP address becomes small
and that of destination IP address increases. On the contrary,
in the attack phase, attack packets have diverse source IP
addresses and a target destination IP address. The entropy
value of source IP address increases and that of destination IP
address converges to a very small value. Similarly, the entropy
values of source and destination port numbers can be useable
for DDoS detection since some types of DDoS attacks use
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random port numbers in the attack. In addition, one DDoS
attack may use a specific type of packets, for example ICMP
flood attack. Considering this, the entropy value of packet type
may be useful. If the entropy value of packet type is very
small, it is possible that some kind of DDoS attack is being
launched.
In DDoS attacks, a large number of packets heading for the
victim are generated in a short time, in order to congest the
bandwidth of the victim. Therefore, the number of packets in
a certain time interval is worth observing as well.
In our experiments, we use the same nine features which
were mentioned in [5]. The features are
 Entropy of source IP address and port number.
 Entropy of destination IP address and port number.
 Entropy of packet type.
 Number of packets.
 Occurrence rate of packet type (ICMP, UDP, TCP SYN).
Before using these nine features as input to the clustering
algorithm, each variable should be normalized to eliminate the
effect of difference between scales of the variables [5]. After
normalization, variables become
x0 =
x  x

where x and  are the mean and standard deviation value,
respectively, of each variable.
B. Clustering algorithm
K-means is one of the most popular clustering algorithms.
However, the K-means algorithm uses a local search procedure
and it suffers from the serious drawback that its performance
heavily depends on the initial starting conditions[17], [18].
To solve this problem, Likas et al. [18] proposed the Global
K-means (GKM) clustering algorithm. However, GKM is not
applicable for clustering on middle sized and large data sets
[19]. Considering this, Bagirov [19] proposed MGKM. In a
DDoS attack, a large number of packets are generated to
launch attack, so the data sets of such attacks are usually large.
Therefore, we use MGKM as the basic clustering algorithm
in our experiment.
MGKM is an incremental clustering algorithm. This al-
gorithm computes clusters incrementally and computes a k-
partition of a data set using k   1 cluster centers from the
previous iteration. It computes as many clusters as a data set
contains with respect to a given tolerance.
C. Feature ranking
According to the original clustering solution with eight
features, we can use feature ranking to figure out the most
sensitive features in order to form a new working feature
vector. Feature ranking ranks all the features with respect to
their relevances and importance to the problem [20]. Many
existing approaches can be used to measure the correlation be-
tween two random variables. One of the most well known and
widely applied measures is the linear correlation coefficient.
There are several benefits of choosing the linear correlation
coefficient as a feature goodness measure for clustering or
classification [21]. First, it helps remove features with near
zero linear correlation to the cluster or class. Second, it helps
reduce redundancy among selected features. It should be noted
that other approaches, such as symmetrical uncertainty [22]
and asymmetric dependency coefficient [23] are also usable
for feature ranking to measure the relevances of the features.
In this paper, the linear correlation coefficient is used because
of its wide application and low complexity.
The linear correlation coefficient approach considers both
values of features and labels of instances as variables and
studies the correlations between the variables of features and
the variable labels [20], [21], [24], [22]. Provided that I
is the clustering solution of data instances, the correlation
coefficient between the feature fr and the clustering solution
I is calculated as follows [20]:
(fr; I) =
cov(fr; I)
(fr)(I)
where (I) is the standard deviation of the labels of instances
and the covariance cov(fr,I) between fr and I is:
cov(fr; I) =
nP
i=1
(f 0r   dir)(I 0   Ii)
n
where Ii is the label of the instance di and I 0 is the mean
of labels of instances. The standard deviation (fr) can be
calculated as:
(fr) =
vuut nP
i=1
(f 0r   dir)2
n
and f 0r is the mean of the feature fr,
f 0r =
nP
i=1
(dir)
n
After the linear correlation coefficients of all features have
been calculated, the features are ranked according to their
linear correlation coefficients.
D. Adaptive process
In the section of feature ranking, we ranked all the pre-
liminary variables according to the values of their linear
correlation coefficients. Different testing data sets or clus-
tering algorithms will produce different ranking lists of the
preliminary variables. The principle is that, the higher the
ranking of the feature, the more relevant to the clustering result
the feature is. This means not all of the features make the
same contribution to the clustering result. The least important
features can be regarded as redundant features and be removed.
The quality of the clusters can be improved by eliminating
the influence of the redundant features, and the efficiency of
clustering algorithm can be raised by reducing dimensionality
and removing irrelevant features. Therefore, it is worthwhile
to find out the most sensitive features corresponding to the
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clustering algorithm in order to get more accurate detection
results with fewer features.
We draw a graph of the absolute value of the linear
correlation coefficient against number in the ranked feature
subset. The graph indicates the linear correlation coefficients
in a decreasing order. Simultaneously, we draw a graph to
indicate the values of the cluster function (objective) cor-
responding to different numbers of the top-ranked features.
It is important to find out the kink points in both graphs
which correspond to dramatic change of the absolute value
of the linear correlation coefficient or the magnitude of the
cluster function. There should be significant improvement of
the clustering result at the mutual kink point. In the graph of
the linear correlation coefficient, we identify the point at which
the change in convexity of the linear correlation coefficient
occurs. Meanwhile, in the graph of the cluster function, as
the number of top-ranked features decreases gradually, a point
where the value of the cluster function drops heavily will be
chosen. Combining the analysis of both graphs, we can decide
the number of top-ranked features to form a new working
feature vector. Such feedback is used to provide beneficial
adjustment to the clustering process.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Details of the data set
In our experiments, we use the 2000 DARPA Intrusion
Detection Scenario Specific Data Set [25]. This attack scenario
is carried out over multiple network and audit sessions. These
sessions have been grouped into five attack phases. The five
phases of the attack scenario are:
1) IPsweep of the AFB (Air Force Base) from a remote
site.
2) Probe of live IP’s to look for the sadmind daemon
running on Solaris hosts.
3) Breakins via the sadmind vulnerability, both successful
and unsuccessful on those hosts.
4) Installation of the trojan mstream DDoS software on
three hosts at the AFB.
5) Launching the DDoS.
In this attack scenario, the attacker can only launch a DDoS
attack via the DMZ network. And the packets collected at the
sniffer in the DMZ network are kept in the DMZ Tcpdump
file. Considering this, we use the DMZ Tcpdump file as our
testing data set.
In phase 1, the attacker sends ICMP Echo Requests and
listens for ICMP Echo Replies to determine which hosts are
alive. Besides, most of packets passing by the network in
phase 1 are ICMP packets. In phase 2, each of the hosts
discovered in phase 1 are probed by sadmind exploit program
which generates UDP packets to determine the hosts which
have vulnerabilities. Phase 3 and phase 4 are the steps that
the attacker intrudes agent hosts and installs DDoS software,
therefore, the changes in network traffic do not appear. In
phase 5, packets collected in the DMZ network are not the
attack packets but the response packets to the spoofed IP
addresses of the attack packets [5]. With respect to clustering,
all these phases could be extracted except phase 3 and phase
4.
B. Results and analysis
In our experiment, each input variable is calculated in a
certain time interval which is 1 second and normalized at the
beginning. According to the recommendation in [19], we use
the tolerance " = 0:1 for MGKM in the following experiments,
in order to control the number of artificial clusters.
Table I shows the clustering result from MGKM with nine
features. The value of each variable of each cluster centroid
is listed in Table I. Cluster 1 and cluster 2 are normal phases.
These two clusters have no significant features to show that
they are specific phases. Cluster 3 corresponds to attack phase.
It has very low entropy values of source IP address. On the
contrary, the entropy values of destination IP address, source
port number, destination port number are very high. In this
attack scenario, the agents use randomly spoofed source IP
address, source port number and destination port number.
At the same time, the destination IP address is the target.
With respect to attack phase, the entropy values of source
IP address, source port number and destination port number
should be much bigger than the entropy value of destination
IP address. However, packets collected in the DMZ network
are the response packets to the attack packets, so we get the
opposite result. Another obvious feature is that the number
of packets in cluster 3 is quite large. A DDoS attack usually
uses a lot of packets to block the victim’s network. In cluster
4, the occurrence rate of UDP and ICMP packets are the
highest. Therefore, cluster 4 can be called pre-attack phase,
which including phase 1 and phase 2 of the attack scenario.
In cluster 5, the occurrence rate of TCP SYN is higher than
other clusters, but the number of packets is not big enough to
conclude that this is flooding attack.
According to the clustering solution of the preliminary
nine features, we use the linear correlation coefficient to
make a feature ranking. Table II shows a ranking list of
all the nine features. Figure 2 (a) indicates the value of the
linear correlation coefficient between each feature and the
clustering solution. Figure 2 (b) demonstrates the value of
cluster function corresponding to different numbers of the top-
ranked features.
In Figure 2 (a), the point of ranking=6 indicates a change
in convexity of the graph. In Figure 2 (b), the value of cluster
function drops dramatically from the top seven features to the
top six features. Combining these two graphs, as the dashed
line shows, there should be significant improvement of the
clustering result when we choose the top six features as the
new working feature vector.
Table III shows the clustering result of MGKM with the top
six features. In Table III, cluster 1 and cluster 2 are normal
phases. Cluster 3 corresponds to attack. Cluster 4 is phase 2,
since the occurrence rate of UDP packets is extremely high.
Cluster 5 is phase 1, because the occurrence of ICMP packets
is much higher than other clusters.
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TABLE I
CLUSTERING RESULT OF MGKM WITH PRELIMINARY NINE FEATURES
Variable Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5
normal normal attack pre-attack normal
Entropy of source IP 1.95 0.72 0.02 1.81 1.93
Entropy of destination IP 1.94 0.72 12.65 1.90 1.93
Entropy of source port 1.79 0.72 12.47 2.01 2.67
Entropy of destination port 1.60 0.71 12.65 2.11 2.70
Entropy of packet type 0.22 0.08 0.00 1.01 0.15
Packet number 30.72 21.93 6460.40 27.45 102.15
Occurance rate of TCP SYN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.07
Occurance rate of UDP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.01
Occurance rate of ICMP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00
TABLE II
THE LINEAR CORRELATION COEFFICIENT
Variable Ranking
Entropy of source IP 8
Entropy of destination IP 9
Entropy of source port 3
Entropy of destination port 2
Entropy of packet type 7
Packet number 5
Occurance rate of TCP SYN 1
Occurance rate of UDP 4
Occurance rate of ICMP 6
Fig. 2. Graphs used in the adaptive process
Compared with that of nine features, the clustering result of
the top six features extracts phase 1 and phase 2 separately.
And each cluster has much stronger characteristics than that
of nine features. It achieves better result with less features.
This improvement can reduce measurement, storage and com-
putation requirement while efficiency of clustering algorithm
is raised. It indicates that our adaptive clustering method is
effective in DDoS attacks detection.
V. DISCUSSION
In terms of feature ranking, we have used the linear cor-
relation coefficient in this paper. However, this method may
not be able to capture correlations that are not linear in nature
[21]. Under such circumstances, other methods can be used
to measure the relevances of the features, for example, the
symmetrical uncertainty [21].
From the experimental results, we can see that it is not
the case that more features provide better performance. When
we use MGKM on the 2000 DARPA Intrusion Detection
Scenario Specific Data Set, the entropy of source IP address
and the entropy of destination IP address can not make efficient
contribution to the clustering result other than disturbing. It
seems that the features can influence each other when we use
a specific clustering algorithm. The correlation between the
features is a interesting problem.
When analyzing the parameters of network traffic, the
entropy of source IP address and the entropy of destination
IP address usually appear as a pair, in order to reveal some
clues of the traffic data distribution, so as the entropy of source
port and entropy of destination port. In the following analysis,
the two pairs of features will be called group 1 and group 2
separately. In Table I, we can find that
 In each cluster except attack, the information indicated
by group 1 is almost the same as that shown by group
2. It seems no need to determine the clusters with both
groups. Either group can be removed since no additional
information can be gained.
 In attack cluster, we can make decision with the infor-
mation indicated by the features of group 1 or the packet
number feature. Either of them is enough to determine the
attack phase. In that case, we can remove one of them.
In conclusion, the features in group 1 seem to be redundant
when we use MGKM on the 2000 DARPA Intrusion Detection
Scenario Specific Data Set. In [22], the authors said ”Perfectly
correlated variables are truly redundant in the sense that
no additional information is gained by adding them”. This
inference has been brought out by the experimental result in
section IV as well.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have used an approach to the identification
of DDoS attacks based on a sound incremental clustering
algorithm (MGKM) and feature ranking. This approach moves
some way towards having an effective automatic approach to
determine cluster structure of DDoS attacks. It is less reliant on
the subjective judgements that have to be made in the existing
statistical approaches and produces result that make sense.
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TABLE III
CLUSTERING RESULT OF MGKM WITH THE TOP SIX FEATURES
Variable Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5
normal normal attack phase 2 phase 1
Entropy of source port 1.40 2.64 12.47 1.61 0.83
Entropy of destination port 1.27 2.66 12.65 1.60 0.90
Packet number 26.78 91.47 6460.40 7.17 45.05
Occurance rate of TCP SYN 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.00
Occurance rate of UDP 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.56 0.01
Occurance rate of ICMP 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.80
In order to evaluate this method, we experimented with the
2000 DARPA Intrusion Detection Scenario Specific Data Set.
As a result, we obtained two normal clusters, phase 1, phase
2 and the attack cluster respectively with only six features.
Lee et al. [5] used nine features on the same data set. They
produced six clusters comprising two normal clusters, phase
1, phase 2, attack, and post-attack. Considering the post-attack
cluster, it is likely to be an artificial cluster which should be
contained in attack cluster, because both clusters have similar
characteristics. Compared with their scheme, our method is
adaptive and can gain a sound cluster structure.
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